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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

:

Appellee,

:

vs.

:

ROLANDO CALEB BECKER

:

Appellant.

:

Case No. 950408-CA

Priority No. 2

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
In response to Mr. Becker1 s contention that the inadequate
voir dire requires a new trial, the State first contends that
because Mr. Becker is relying on inferences of bias, and does not
allege actual bias on the part of any juror, his claim fails under
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 910
(1995), which states on page 398, "To prevail on a claim of error
based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must
demonstrate prejudice, viz.,
partial or incompetent.11

show that a member of the jury was

State's brief at 12-13.

Contrary to the State' s implicit argument, Menzies does not
overrule the law requiring trial courts to rebut inferences of
juror bias during voir dire or remove the tainted jurors, such as
that set forth in State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.),
1

cert, deniedf 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Menzies overrules the law
which required

new trials

if a defendant used

a peremptory

challenge to remove a juror after a trial court erroneously denied
a challenge for cause, such as Crawford v. Manningf 542 P.2d 1091
(Utah 1975).

This is clear from reading the State's quotation of

Menzies in context:
The State, on the other hand, asks us to overturn
the Crawford line of cases and follow the approach
utilized by a majority of the states and upheld by the
federal courts. Those following the majority approach
"reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional
right to an impartial jury." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). "So
long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that
the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to
achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was
violated." Id. (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436,
7 S.Ct. 614, 616, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887)). To prevail on a
claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for
cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.
See id., 487 U.S. at 89, 108 S.Ct. at 2278.
We agree
with the State and overrule Crawford and its progeny.
Menzies at 398.
In any event, Mr. Becker has demonstrated that " a member of
the jury was partial or incompetent," for Utah case law establishes
that when jurors are tainted with an inference of bias, they are
considered incompetent. For instance, in State v. Brooksf 563 P.2d
799 (Utah 1977), the court stated,
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, in mandatory
terms, guarantees the accused in a criminal proceeding
the right to a trial by an impartial jury. To comply
with this command, the legislature enacted Chapt. 30,
Title 77, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. To effect
the purpose of a trial by an impartial jury, the
legislature provided the accused with the right to
challenge a juror for actual bias. Section 77-30-18(2),
defines /actual bias7 as 'the existence of a state of
2

mind on the part of the juror which leads to a just
inference in reference to the case that he will not act
with entire impartiality.' (Emphasis supplied.)t1]
'Impartiality' is not a technical conception but is
a state of mind? it is a mental attitude of appropriate
indifference.
A jury, in its role as a fact finder, must weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.
A juror, who through a personal association with a
witness or party has developed a relationship of
affection, respect, or esteem, cannot be deemed
disinterested, indifferent, impartial.
This point is illustrated in State v. Jackson,
wherein a prospective juror was challenged for cause. He
had been a neighbor and friend and gone to church with
several officers in the police department.
In
particular, he had been a close friend with Detective
Lynes. Nevertheless, the prospective juror stated that
if Detective Lynes contradicted the testimony of another
witness he would not, because of his friendship, incline
towards giving credence to his testimony.
The trial
court refused to excuse the prospective juror for cause,
and defendant urged, on appeal, the ruling constituted
prejudicial error.
The court acknowledged the trial
court is vested with broad discretionary powers in
determining the qualifications of jurors, and its
exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed
on appeal.
. . . Nevertheless, we are satisfied that, under
the particular circumstances here, the refusal to excuse
Mr. Carolan constituted error which impaired the right of
the defendants to competent and impartial jurors. His
close relationship with members of the Elizabeth police
department, particularly Detective Lynes, suggests
inability to deal with the evidence with the measure of
impartiality required by the law. It must be borne in
mind that Detective Lynes was an important State's
1

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(4) is the current
provision governing this type of challenge. Like its forebear in
Brooks, the rule does not speak in terms of actual bias, but in
terms of inference of bias. It provides that a challenge for
cause lies when
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective
juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism. . . .
3

witness whose credibility was under direct attack.
Though Mr. Carolan may have been wholly sincere in his
statement that his long and close friendship with
Detective Lynes would have no bearing whatever on the
issue of credibility, we find it difficult to accept for
it runs counter to human nature. . . .
A juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence
of his friend against the evidence of strangers and of
the defendant so as to strike a balance between them as
the law requires, viz., stand indifferent between the
state and the accused. Where there have been personal
associations, such as the ones here; to remain
uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced; runs counter to
human nature.
One cannot be deemed indifferent or
impartial.
Brooks at 801-802 (court1 s footnotes omitted; footnote in brackets
added by Mr. Becker).
Specifically in response to Mr. Becker' s contention that a new
trial is required by the service of Juror Connor, who had hired the
prosecutor to perform legal work on his grandmother' s estate three
months prior to the trial, the State argues that Mr. Becker's
failure to remove juror Connor with a peremptory challenge should
constitute a waiver of his claim regarding Mr. Connor' s partiality.
State's brief at 13 n.2.

The State recognizes that this Court

rejected a similar argument in State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah
App. 1995), but seeks to distinguish Baker on the ground that Baker
involved a juror who was actually biased. State' s brief at 13 n.2.
The Baker rule and its underlying analysis are not limited to
cases involving actual bias.

Because Mr. Becker exhausted his

peremptory challenges and a tainted juror remained, he is entitled
to reversal under Baker.

884 P.2d at 1287.

On the merits, the State argues that the trial court did not
abuse his discretion because the prosecutor represented Connor' s
4

grandmother1 s estate, rather than Mr. Connor. State1 s brief at 15.
The factual accuracy of this assertion is questionable, inasmuch as
the grandmother1 s estate was being probated on the East coast, and
the prosecutor was hired by Mr. Connor and his brother to write a
letter to an attorney who was apparently involved in the probate
case.

State* s brief at 15. Regardless of who the prosecutor was

technically representing, Mr. Connor' s hiring of the prosecutor to
perform legal services three months prior to the trial in this case
reflects confidence, respect and trust in the prosecutor, which
raised an inference of bias. Cox.
Contrary to the State' s position, the questions posed by the
trial court did not rebut an inference of bias, but simply asked
the juror to assess his own partiality (T. 72-73).

Utah law has

long recognized that when the voir dire raises an inference of
bias, the trial court must himself inquire to rebut the inference,
and may not simply ask the juror to assess his own qualification to
serve.

Seg e.g. State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.),

cert, deniedf 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)(when prospective juror has
been a victim of a crime similar to that at issue in the case, an
inference of bias arises, which is not rebutted by a juror's claim
that he can be fair and impartial).
In seeking to diminish the significance of Mr. Connor* s choice
of the prosecutor as an attorney three months prior to this trial,
the State cites State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983)(per
curiam).

State's brief at 16.

Lacey involved a juror who was

acquainted with two witnesses in the case, and turned on the fact
5

that the witnesses were not challenged by the defense, and provided
unimportant testimony.

See Lacey at 1312 (• Although it might have

been better to have excused Orme for cause, we find no error in
leaving him on the panel. This is particularly so when the nature
of the testimony offered by Carlquist and Adams is considered.
Their credibility was not questioned and their testimony was not
crucial to the prosecution's case/ )(footnotes omitted).
In contrast, the relationship between the challenged juror
Connor was between him and the State' s attorney, the leader and
advocate of the entire prosecution against Mr. Becker.

See Cox

(addressing law specific to juror relationships with parties'
attorneys).

The trial court did not ask juror Connor his opinion

of the prosecutor, whether he was pleased or dissatisfied with the
prosecutor1 s work for him, or any other questions meaningfully
addressing Mr. Connor1 s attitude toward the prosecutor.

Under

State v. CoxP 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), Mr. Becker is entitled
to a new trial.
In addressing the service of juror Newell, the juror who had
known the prosecutor, Trooper Mangelson and another police officer
witness since they had been in high school, and conceded that he
had "a pretty good regard" for them, the State would like this
Court to believe that juror Newell "was acquainted with Mr. Eyre
and Sergeant Mangelson only when they were high school students,
without any subsequent relationship," State's brief at 20.

The

record actually demonstrates that their relationships were ongoing
not only as a result of Mr. Newell' s service as their high school
6

principal, but also as a result of his membership

in their

community (T. 75-76)• The transcript pages containing Mr. Newell' s
voir dire on this point are in Appendix 1 to this brief.
In seeking to justify juror Newell' s service, the States cites
State v. Cobbr 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989); State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d
22 (Utah 1984); and State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App.), cert.
deniedf 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). In contrast to the record in the
instant case demonstrating an ongoing relationship, the records in
Cobb and Hewitt demonstrated that relationships at issue there
began and ended in high school fifteen and twenty years before the
trials in those cases, and did not involve contact between the
jurors and state' s witnesses between the high school acquaintance
and trials. Cobbr 775 P.2d 1123, 1126; Hewittr 689 P.2d 22, 25-26.
In Gray, there is no indication that the juror was acquainted with
any witness who testified against Mr. Gray or the prosecutor in the
case; the juror had simply worked as a highway patrol trooper and
knew the town sheriff in a case where the witnesses were apparently
members

of the police

force, and not sheriff s deputies or

troopers. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1222-23. In the instant case, the
juror was acquainted with key witnesses for the State, whose
testimony was directly contested by the defense case in many
important regards. The State' s reliance on Cobb, Hewittf and Gray
is thus misplaced.
The State

asserts that there was no inference of bias

attaching to juror Elmer, whose step-daughter he characterized as
a "victim of drugs" after her criminal prosecution. State's brief
7

at 21. The State cites State v. TennysonP 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App.
1993),

for the proposition

that there is no rule requiring

automatic disqualification of jurors related to victims of crimes
similar to those with which the defendant stands charged. State' s
brief at 21.
While there is no automatic disqualification of jurors related
to victims of similar crimes, when a juror such as juror Elmer
indicates that his relative has been a victim of a similar crime
this raises an inference of bias, which must be investigated by the
trial court prior to the juror1 s service on the case, with
questions going beyond merely asking the juror if he can be
impartial.

E.g. State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah App.

1995).
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Becker is not entitled to
a new trial as a result of the inadequate voir dire because trial
counsel was "fully engaged" in the voir dire. State' s brief at 2224, citing Tennysonf

850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), and State v.

Ellifritzr 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992).
Reference to the record demonstrates that trial counsel' s
performance cannot be condoned on the theory that he was exercising
legitimate trial strategy, as was exercised

in Tennyson and

Ellifritz, because trial counsel did not understand

the law

governing voir dire, which law he should have asserted on his
client' s behalf.
In

this

case,

eight

of

the

prospective

jurors

had

relationships with the prosecutor and/or police officers testifying
8

against Mr. Becker, and the trial court did not ask any questions
to assess the potential bias, other than perfunctory questions
asking the jurors to assess their ability to serve impartially (T.
69-79).

When the trial court gave the defense the opportunity to

ask supplemental voir dire questions, trial counsel did not inquire
further about the jurors' relationships with the officers (T. 1070111).

Trial counsel did not seek further voir dire of the juror

who characterized his step-daughter as a victim of drugs as a
result of having been prosecuted for some offense.
This was not acceptable trial strategy because the witnesses
were presumptively biased without further voir dire.

E.g. Cox;

WpoUey, su^ra.
Outside

the

jury1 s presence

when

it was

time

to make

challenges for cause, trial counsel stated on the record, "Also it
goes without saying that the fact that a number of these jurors
know one or more of these officers is not going to be grounds for
cause because of the practicality of it.

It is a small town and

they are going to run into these people from time to time."

When

the court indicated, "Well, the fact that they know them, I don't
think is grounds for cause any where," trial counsel stated that he
understood.

(T. 129).

This does not reflect acceptable trial strategy.

If a trial

takes place in a small town where the jurors and witnesses are
necessarily acquainted, the proper procedure is to conduct an
adequate voir dire to seat a fair jury, or to change the venue if
this is not possible. E.g. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah
9

1989).

All defendants are entitled to a fair trial, which is

impossible absent an adequate voir dire, regardless of the size of
the town in which the trial is initiated.
753 P.2d

439, 448 and nn. 1-6

E.g.

State v. Bishop,

(Utah 1988) (citing Article I,

sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed on
other grounds, State v. Menziesf 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
Trial counsel asked the prosecutor if he knew if the jurors1
relationships with the police went beyond mere casual recognition,
and the trial court indicated that the prosecutor could answer if
he knew, but that the jurors were the best sources of that
information (T. 130).

The prosecutor indicated that the police

officers were from Levan, the court noted that some of the
prospective jurors were from Levan, and no additional voir dire was
requested or conducted on this topic (T. 130).
This was not acceptable trial strategy.
recognized,

the

jurors were

the

sources

As the trial court
of

the

information

necessary to insure Mr. Becker' s right to a fair trial. In relying
on the prosecutor to provide whatever information he had about
juror-witness relationships, rather than seeking an adequate voir
dire, trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Cf. Tennyson
(record demonstrated reasonable performance by trial counsel) and
Ellifritz (same).
The

State

speculates

that

trial

counsel

abandoned

the

challenge for cause of juror Connor as a result of his " full
engagement" in the voir dire process. State" s brief at 22-23. The
10

law establishes that Mr. Becker is entitled to a new trial because
the trial court improperly denied a challenge for cause of Connor,
who served on the jury because Mr. Becker exhausted his peremptory
challenges on other jurors (R. 174). See Bakerf supra.
Because three incompetent jurors actually deliberated in Mr.
Becker' s case, through no fault of Mr. Becker' s, he is entitled to
a new trial.

See Point I of Mr. Becker's opening brief.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that Trooper Mangelson
should have advised the occupants of the car about their Miranda
rights prior to asking them if they had been smoking marijuana and
telling them that the smell was as plain as day and that he knew
they were using it, the State argues first that the occupants were
not entitled to Miranda warnings.

State' s brief at 34-38.

The

State first indicates that Mangelson' s statements are the only
factor distinguishing the scenario in this case from an ordinary
traffic stop, State's brief at 36-37, failing to recognize the
significance of Mangelson' s choice to keep Mr. Becker' s driver' s
license.

See State v. Shoulderblade, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 29

(Utah 1995) (recognizing that one is not free to leave when driver' s
license is being held by police).

Seeking to distinguish this

case from State v. Mirquetr 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmedf 268
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), the State contends that Mangelson's
statements were not accusatorial enough to require a Miranda
warning beforehand.

State's brief at 37.
11

When a police officer

has

stopped

a

car

and

does

not

return

the

passenger' s

identification, but doggedly insists that the passengers have been
smoking marijuana,
this constitutes custodial interrogation which should have been
preceded by Miranda warnings.

Mirquet.

In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that Trooper Mangelson
should not have searched any part of the car because there were no
exigent circumstances, the State first argues that trial counsel
did not preserve the claim of exigent circumstances. State' s brief
at 27-28.
The record reflects that the issue was raised adequately in
the trial court. Mr. Means filed a motion to suppress in the trial
court, which invoked Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution
(R. 170-171).

In arguing the motion to suppress, Mr. Means

conceded that the smell of marijuana may have provided probable
cause and a basis for a search warrant, but did not provide
authority to search (T. 58-59).

This argument was consistent with

the law already established at the time of trial, that under the
Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are not permitted in the
absence of exigent circumstances. E.g. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d
460, 4700 (Utah 1990)(plurality); State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969,
973 n.7 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 n.2
(Utah App. 1993).
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that this Court may
reach the issue by way of the plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrines, in the event that the Court feels that the
12

issue was not preserved below, the State argues that the brief on
State1 s

appeal is inadequate because it simply cites to Larocco.

brief at 28. Mr. Becker's opening brief on appeal cites not only
Larocco, but also cites to Naisbitt and Dudley, both of which cases
recognize that Utah law already establishes the need for exigent
circumstances, and also cites State v. Spurcreon, 274 Utah Adv. Rep.
35 (Utah 1995), contrasting the federal law. Mr. Becker's opening
brief at 25-26.
Where the state constitutional principles are already established,
citation to the controlling authorities should suffice.
v. Amiconer

Cf. State

689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)(court declined to

address issue raised in brief, absent legal analysis or authority).
In any event, it appears that federal law now comports with
prior Utah law, in requiring not only probable cause, but also
exigent circumstances in order to justify searches of automobiles.
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (plurality).
The State argues that the facts here demonstrate exigent
circumstances, because Trooper Mangelson was a lone officer dealing
with three evasive suspects, one of whom tried to drive away.
State's brief at 29.

It was not until the trooper completed the

illegal search of the trunk that Mr. Becker ran away, so this event
is not properly used to justify the search.

As the record

demonstrates, backup officers were just a radio call away from
Trooper Mangelson, who could have detained the individuals while he
obtained a telephone warrant.

In these circumstances, there were

no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search.
13

But

see State v. Anderson (plurality), supra (indicating that exigent
circumstances existed when occupants of movable car were alerted to
police presence, and evidence may have been lost if warrant was
sought).
The State makes no effort to prove that finding of the
evidence

by

Trooper

Mangelson

was

attenuated

from

preceding

illegalities, given the State* s position that there were no
preceding illegalities.

State's brief at 31-32.

Mr. Becker

maintains that the trooper' s violation of his Miranda rights, the
trooper' s performance of a warrantless search absent exigent
circumstances, and the trooper' s coercion of the occupants of the
car constitute illegalities fatally tainting any consent that may
have been given to the search.

See Mr. Becker' s opening brief at

19-27.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE REQUESTED LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION.
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to give the requested class
A misdemeanor joyriding instruction, the State concedes that the
charged offense and requested offense contain overlapping elements,
and the first prong of Baker is met.

State's brief at 39 n.10.

The State contends that the second prong of Baker was not met
because there was no rational basis for acquitting Mr. Becker of
the charged offense and convicting him of class A misdemeanor
joyriding.

The State argues that the defense evidence indicated
14

that Mr. Becker stole no car at all, and that he is therefore not
entitled to the lesser instruction.

State's brief at 41-43.2

Lisa LaBarrie did not maintain that Mr. Becker "absolutely did
not get into a car but ran into an open field/ State' s brief at
41.

She testified that she could not see all of the area where

events may have occurred, did not see Mr. Becker take the car or
see anyone take a car, but saw Mr. Becker run into an open field
(T. 309-310).

Copies of the transcript pages containing her

testimony are in Appendix 2.

The State1 s evidence indicated that

Mr. Becker took the car in circumstances susceptible to the
inference that his intent was to temporarily deprive the owner of
her car, State's brief at 40-41, and the trial court recognized
this to some extent in giving the third degree felony lesser
included offense instruction (T. 341). In these circumstances, the
trial court should have given the requested class A misdemeanor

a

The State argues,

The only defense witness, Lisa LaBarrie,
maintained that defendant absolutely did not get into a
car but ran into an open field (T. 309-10). Thus, the
only evidence introduced by defense counsel was that
the defendant did not steal any car at all, not that he
intended to only temporarily deprive the owner of her
property.
In the absence of any evidence presented of
defendant' s intent to temporarily deprive the owner of
the vehicle, the trial court was correct in refusing to
give the defendant' s proposed lesser included offense
instruction. See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790
(Utah 1987)(manslaughter instruction properly refused
in second-degree murder conviction where all the
evidence the defendant presented at trial was to the
effect that he had not caused the victim' s death.
State's brief at 41.
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instruction. Cf. State v. Shabataf 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984)(trial
court

properly

denied

requested

lesser

included

offense

instruction, where defense evidence and theory of the case were
inconsistent with requested instruction).
The State argues that any error in denying the class A
instruction was harmless because the jury rejected the option of
convicting Mr. Becker of the third degree felony lesser included
offense.

State's brief at 43-44.

The trial court1 s failure to give the requested class A
misdemeanor lesser included offense instruction was not harmless
because the lesser included offense instruction given by the court
was inconsistent with all evidence presented at trial.

The court

gave the jury an instruction on third degree felony joyriding,
which stated,
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I,
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you my find the
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle for an Extended
Period of Time, a Third Degree Felony, if you find the
following:
-The Defendant;
-On or about 7 October, 1993;
-In Juab County, State of Utah;
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle;
-And did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or
lawful custodian
-within 24 hours of the exercise of unlawful control.
(R. 212). The jury's decision to reject this option may well be
based on the fact that the car was recovered the same day that Mr.
Becker took the car, or on the basis that it was not Mr. Becker who
returned the car.
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On the evidence presented, the more appropriate instruction
was the one refused by the trial court# which stated,
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I,
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class 'A"
misdemeanor, if you find the following:
-The Defendant;
-On or about 7 October, 1993;
-In Juab County, State of Utah;
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle;
-not his own;
-without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian;
-with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle.
(R. 120).
Because the class A misdemeanor instruction met both prongs of
the Baker test, and the trial court committed reversible error in
failing to give it. Icl.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF
THE PAPER BAG.
In addressing Mr. Becker' s claim that he is entitled to a new trial
by virtue of the trial court* s ruling that Trooper Mangelson could
testify that the bag that Mr. Becker ran away with contained an
illegal drug, the State argues that this Court should not address
the claim because Mr. Becker did not provide the Court with a
transcript of the trial court' s initial hearing of hearing wherein
Mr. Becker' s motion to exclude this evidence was initially argued.
State's brief at 44-45, citing State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 228
(Utah 1992); and State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 437 (Utah 1983).
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Menzies and Taylor do not support the State1 s assertion that uwhere
defendant fails to provide[] an adequate record for review, the
appellate court is precluded

from considering the matter on

appeal/ State' s brief at 44-45.

In Menzies, the court found that

errors in the transcripts were not sufficiently serious to defeat
the defendant" s right to appellate review, and in Taylor, the court
determined that omissions in the transcript were so serious that
the defendant was entitled to a new trial.

Those cases are thus

inapposite.
There are cases which require the appellant to provide a
sufficient record to permit meaningful appellate review.

E.g.

State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985). In the case before the
Court, the record contains a copy of the motion in limine (R. 126127), the transcript containing trial counsel' s argument in support
of the motion in limine (T. 24-25), the prosecutor's argument in
response (T. 25), and the trial court's rulings (T. 25; R. 162).
Appellate review on the merits is therefore appropriate.
On the merits of the issue, the State contends that the
contents of the bag were relevant and not prejudicial, to establish
the identity of the evidence to support the tampering with evidence
charge.

State's brief at 46-47.3

In this argument, the State

proceeds as though proof of relevance of evidence concomitantly
proves a lack of prejudice.

State' s brief at 46-47.

3

This justification for the admission of the evidence
differs from the State' s position in the trial court, where the
prosecutor argued that he needed to submit evidence concerning
the contents of the bag in order to justify the continuing
investigation (T. 25).
18

It is not proper to obviate the prejudice analysis under rule
403 simply because evidence may be relevant under rule 401.

See

Mr. Becker1 s opening brief at 33-35.
Under the evidence tampering statute/ to prove evidence
tampering, the only evidence that the State needed to identify was
the brown paper bag that Mr. Becker allegedly took.

The contents

of the bag did not make any fact in issue more or less probable,
and the contents were thus irrelevant under rule 401.
The State argues that any potential error in the admission of
the evidence was harmless.

State1 s brief at 47-48.

The evidence supporting and contesting the tampering with the
evidence charge was for the jury to evaluate. The possibility that
their deliberations were swayed by the improper admission of
Trooper

Mangelson' s

speculation

that

the

bag

contained

methamphetamine or crack cocaine is very real, and heightened by
the prosecutor' s closing argument that the jury should convict Mr.
Becker because he had already "beat the system" by running away
with the drugs and avoiding a more serious prosecution (T. 353-54).

4

Tampering with evidence is defined by Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-8-510 as follows:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.
19

Because the evidence was improperly admitted and there stands
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence
of such error, this Court should grant Mr. Becker a new trial. See
Point IV of Mr. Becker' s opening brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Becker requests a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, improper evidence is excluded, and the jury is instructed
properly.
Respectfully submitted this
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Appendix 1

MR. BART WANKIER:
THE COURT:
with them

No.

You recognize them

when you see

them?

MR. BART WANKIER:
THE COURT:
you have no other

Yes sir,

But outside of

MR. BART WANKIER:

in this

As a result of that

is that

acquaintance

be prejudicial

for or against

No s i r .

And could you

set that

acquaintance

aside and fairly and impartially

decide this case

on the evidence presented

courtroom?

in this

M R . BART W A N K I E R :
THE C O U R T :

correct?

case?

MR. BART WANKIER:
THE COURT:

acquaintance

No s i r .

with these o f f i c e r s , would you
either party

the speaking

socialization with them

THE COURT:

and do speak

solely

Yes s i r .

Anyone else acquainted

with Mr. Eyre

or his w i t n e s s e s , Mr. N e w e l l .
M R . CLARK N E W E L L :
THE C O U R T :
and with

What

Yes.
is the nature of your

acquaintance

whom?
MR. CLARK N E W E L L :

I have been the High

School

Pri nci pal .
THE COURT:

To all of

MR. CLARK N E W E L L :

them?

And a member of the

community

W e l l , Mr. Eyre and Mr. Mangelson and one or two of the other
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1

on the S h e r i f f ' s Department and I c a n ' t remember t h e i r

2

names now.

3

THE COURT:

Well, being their High School

4

Principal, did that prejudice you in any fashion

5

any of them?

6 1
7

MR. CLARK NEWELL:
for them, beyond that
THE COURT:

9 I

MR. CLARK NEWELL:
THE COURT:

Well, I had a pretty good regarjd

I don't think so.

8 1

10

against

Didn't give you a lot of trouble?
Not especially no.

As a result of your

acquaintance

11

with the police officers and with Mr. Eyre, would

12

you be prejudice for or against either party in this

13

case?

14

MR. CLARK NEWELL:

15

THE COURT:

And you could

16 1 and fairly and impartailly
17

I don't think so.

try this case based on the

evidence that has come forth in this courtroom ?

18

MR CLARK NEWELL:

19

THE COURT:

20

row behind the bar.

21

Eyre or any

Yes.

Okay, thank you.

Let's go to the

Is anyone there acquainted with Mr.

of the witnesses Mr. Reed.

22

MR. MERRILL REED:

23

THE COURT:

24

set aside that acquaintance

Yes sir.

What is the nature of your acqua i ntanc|(

and with whom?
MR. MERRILL REED:

Mr. Eyre

represented me in <

25
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Appendix 2

us and was telling Michael to come here.
Q So you say that he reholstered

the gun when he

searches the trunk and now he takes the gun out again?
A

After he searched the trunk and told me to *a1k to

Rolando and Michael

he had the gun to my back.

He was

behind me.
Q

This officer is a large man isn't he?

A

Yes, he is.

Q

And would he have any reason to fear of the

three of you?
A

Since he assumed that we were gang members maybe tha

is why.
Q

Did he ever pat you down for weapons?

A

No, he didn't.

Q

So after he asks Michael to approach him and he has

got his gun drawn,

at

that point and time, Rolando

takes off running?
A

Yes.

Q Do you know why he ran?
A

I believe because he was scared like all of us.

Q What were you scared of?

cars

A

I was scared of the officer.

Q

This is not an isolated area is it?

There are

going by many?
A There was not many cars at all going by.
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1

Q

You were by a very

2

A

No , i t wasn't l a r g e , there was a gas s t a t i o n and a

3

hotel .

4

Q

5
6
7

l a r g e commercial area were you not]

Wasn't there three gas stations, two restaurants,

two motels, two other
A

businesses?

At the time I don't believe so.

I saw a gas station

and I saw a hotel .

8

Q

Did you see a Burger King.

9

A

You know they were doing construction.

10

Q

Did you see a Burger King?

11

A

No,

12

Q

So you weren't very observant were you?

13

A

No, I wasn't.

14

Q

And where did you see Rolando run to?

15

A

Down the hill.

16

Q What did he do after he got to the bottom of the

17
18
19

I saw a gas station and a hotel.

hill?
A

He ran through the gas station and across the street

and into an open field.

20

Q Did he cross any fences?

21

A

Yes, he did.

22

Q

How many?

23

A

About three maybe .

24

Q

And he ran through the gas station area?

25

A

Yes.

